FILED

Kristine Kussman superior court imperial county ca.

KIMBERLY ALEKSICK, individually and on behalf of other members of the

general public similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

7-ELEVEN, INC., a Texas Corporation;

MICHAEL TUCKER; an individual; and

vs.

DOES 1-50, Inclusive.,

Defendants.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF IMPERIAL

) Case No.: ECU03615

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 7-ELEVEN, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

The motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative for summary adjudication of Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc. came on regularly for hearing on May 12, 2010. After full consideration of the evidence, the separate statements, declaration of each party, as well as counsels' oral argument that there is no triable issue of material fact in this action as to Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc., and that the motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for

Summary adjudication is GRANTED, for the following reasons:

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- Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action in the Fourth Amended Complaint, arising under section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code (Unfair Competition law or "UCL" claim) - a claim of an "unlawful" business practice under the UCL-fails against 7-Eleven as a matter of law. The court finds that judgment is properly granted as there is no triable issue of material fact regarding the methods that 7-Eleven uses to capture the time worked by franchise employees. The following facts are undisputed: franchise employees clock in and out of work on an in-store computer, which records time, worked in "whole minutes." The daily minutes are transmitted to 7-Eleven. At the 7-Eleven host computer the total minutes are added up for the week, then divided by 60 to determine hours and fractional hours worked per week. resulting fraction is "truncated" after the second decimal place. (See 7-Eleven's UMF's in Support of Its Motion \P 20,35,37,38,40,41, Plaintiff's UMF's in Opposition to 7-Eleven's Motion ¶ 25,26,27,29, and the underlying evidence cited therein). Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged at the hearing that the above facts are not in dispute. The court holds that the practice of calculating employee pay based upon the decimal system, rather than using a fractional system, is inherently reasonable, and does not constitute a violation of Section 17200 of the California Business and professions Code.
- 2. The Court also finds that 7-Eleven's business practice of

truncating the decimal point after the second digit once a week is inherently reasonable, and does not violate Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code. The Court takes judicial notice that the input data -- here, the total number of minutes -- is recorded only in whole numbers. Once the whole minutes (the input data) are summed and divided by 60 to determine hours and fractional hours worked, the resultant decimal points have no basis in mathematical reality, because they extend the number of significant digits in the input data. Any decimal point remainder is simply an artifact created by the division of hours into minutes. The truncation of that number beyond the second decimal point is likewise insignificant from a mathematical perspective. Any time not captured by the system is impossible to calculate as damages, because the number lacks mathematical accuracy. This Court holds that where an employer's payroll system includes mathematical computations that have significantly less potential error than the input data into the system, that is not an unfair business practice under Section 17200 as the maximum potential (if not real) error of approximately 30 seconds per period is significantly less than the potential 59 second error inherent in reporting time in whole minutes.

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7-Eleven's Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Plaintiff's

First Cause of Action in the Fourth Amended Complaint -- for breach

of contract against 7-Eleven -- is also GRANTED. The Court holds

that Plaintiffs are, at best, incidental beneficiaries of the

 $^{^{1}}$ 0.009 X 60 = .54 minutes, or approximately 30 seconds per pay period.

Franchise Agreement, and do not have standing as third-party beneficiaries to enforce the terms of the Franchise Agreement. In addition, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that 7-Eleven's truncation practice is not inherently unfair, and further finds that as such, it could not constitute a breach of any contractual duty.

IT IS ORDERED:

- 1. The motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, is granted.
- 2. Judged be granted in favor of Defendant 7-Eleven.
- 3. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action in the Fourth Amended
 Complaint against Defendant 7-Eleven is dismissed with
 prejudice.
- 4. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action in the Fourth Amended
 Complaint against Defendant 7-Eleven is dismissed with
 prejudice.
- 5. Defendant 7-Eleven is awarded costs pursuant to statute.

DATED: 4-30-10

HON. TEMPRE B. JONES
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT